We study the problem of a buyer who gains stochastic rewards by procuring through an auction, multiple units of a service or item from a pool of heterogeneous agents who are strategic on two dimensions, namely cost and capacity. The reward obtained for a single unit from an allocated agent depends on the inherent quality of the agent; the agent's quality is fixed but unknown. Each agent can only supply a limited number of units (capacity of the agent). The cost incurred per unit and capacity (maximum number of units that can be supplied) are private information of each agent. The auctioneer is required to elicit from the agents their costs as well as capacities (making the mechanism design bidimensional) and further, learn the qualities of the agents as well, with a view to maximize her utility. Motivated by this, we design a bidimensional multi-armed bandit procurement auction that seeks to maximize the expected utility of the auctioneer subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality, while simultaneously learning the unknown qualities of the agents. We first work with the assumption that the qualities are known, and propose an optimal, truthful mechanism 2D-OPT for the auctioneer to elicit costs and capacities. Next, in order to learn the qualities of the agents as well, we provide sufficient conditions for a learning algorithm to be Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational. We finally design a novel learning mechanism, 2D-UCB that is stochastic Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational.
Introduction
Auction based mechanisms are widely used to allocate goods or services in the presence of strategic agents. In different contexts, the auctioneer may have different goals such as welfare maximization or utility maximization or revenue maximization or cost minimization. Auction theory generally assumes that the players are symmetric which means they are distinguished only by privately held types such as costs, valuations, or capacities. The theory does not consider the "experience" of an auctioneer resulting from the consumption of the commodity or service. The experience can be uncertain and not known upfront. For example, consider a hospital (auctioneer) interested in procuring a large number of units of a single generic drug from various pharmaceuticals who can supply limited quantities at different production costs. The quality of the procured generic drug from a supplier can depend on several parameters such as methodology used in preparation and other parameters which are inherent to the supplier. In this example and several other real world scenarios, there is an inherent heterogeneity amongst services or items procured from different agents. Therefore, we can attribute to every agent an inherent quality which is a measure of the perceived experience or reward. Thus, in order to maximize her utility, the auctioneer needs to minimize her payments at the same time ensure a required quality of service. If the qualities from different agents are observed repeatedly, the auctioneer can learn the quality of the agents for future optimization.
A strong motivation for this work comes from the setting of crowdsourcing. The quality of human generated data or labels is an important input for an AI process or a machine learning system. With the advent of several crowdsourcing marketplaces, such inputs are now obtained at much less cost from a global pool of heterogeneous crowd workers [9] . These human workers have different quality levels and can be strategic about their costs. The risk of low quality levels is mitigated via learning algorithms which can predict high quality workers while strategic behavior of crowd workers can be addressed via mechanism design. Thus, the auctioneer here is a requester who seeks to procure tasks from strategic crowd workers with privately held costs, privately held capacities, and unknown qualities. Existing work in mechanism design deal mostly with single private parameter. The biparameter nature of the required mechanism is known to be hard. Further, as the qualities need to be learnt simultaneously, this problem is even more challenging.
Motivated by situations such as above, we consider a procurement scenario where a buyer (or auctioneer) wishes to procure multiple units of a service or item from a pool of heterogeneous agents with unknown qualities, privately held costs, and privately held limited capacities. Our goal is to design a procurement auction that learns the qualities of the agents, elicits true costs and capacities from the agents, and maximizes the expected utility of the auctioneer. If the agents are honest in reporting their costs and capacities, the classical Multi-Armed-Bandit (MAB) techniques can be used to learn the qualities. For example, Tran-Thanh et al. [30] have proposed a greedy approach to learn the qualities of the crowd workers. On the other hand, if all the agents have the same quality that is common knowledge but with strategic costs and capacities, the auctioneer can deploy the techniques available in the literature [12, 16] to elicit true costs and capacities. In the setting considered in this work, in addition to strategic costs and capacities, we also address heterogeneity amongst agents and moreover we learn their qualities.
Learning in the presence of strategic agents in a multi armed bandit (MAB) setting leads to MAB mechanisms [6] . In this work, we take a detour from current MAB mechanism theory in two ways. (i) We propose an optimal MAB mechanism that performs nearly as well as an optimal auction with full information, whereas the current literature mainly focuses on social welfare maximization (ii) We provide a characterization for a weaker notion of truthfulness i.e. stochastic Bayesian incentive compatibility that can potentially achieve better regret bounds. More importantly, while the existing research is also limited to learning with agents having single dimensional private information, we design an MAB mechanism when the agents' private information is two dimensional. In particular, following are the contributions of this work:
-We first explore the case of heterogeneous agents with known qualities and provide a characterization for any Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) and Individual Rational (IR) mechanism in a bidimensional setting. Using this characterization, we provide the footprint for a mechanism to be BIC, IR and maximizes the expected utility of the auctioneer (Theorem 2). We then propose an optimal mechanism 2D-OPT which is in fact dominant strategic incentive compatible (DSIC) and IR (Theorem 3). -We next take up the case when the qualities are unknown and derive sufficient conditions for an allocation rule to be implemented in stochastic BIC and IR (Theorem 5). 1 This leads to a learning mechanism 2D-UCB that is stochastic BIC and IR (Theorem 6). We evaluate 2D-UCB through simulations and show that the expected utility of an auctioneer adopting 2D-UCB mechanism approaches that of the omniscient 2D-OPT.
Positioning of our work
An extensive study of auction theory and mechanism design can be found in [19] . The notion of optimal auction was introduced by [23] . Subsequently, there were many significant results in single parameter domains, however, the multiple parameter domain was unexplored until recently. The readers are referred to [13, 22] for more details on optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design. The settings addressed in most of the literature assume additive valuation. In our work, cost and capacity parameters constitute the private information and the valuation of the agents is not additive in these two parameters. Notably, [16] have designed optimal single item multi unit auction for capacitated bidders and this is further developed by [12] for multi-item multi unit auctions. However, as pointed out in Section 1, the above works [12, 16] assume that all agents are of the same quality. In our setting, the agents are heterogeneous and their qualities need to be learnt. If we assume honest agents, the multi-armed-bandit theory [3, 20] is applicable to learn the qualities of the agents. Upper confidence bound based algorithms have been designed to learn unknown quantities with logarithmic regrets [8] . In the specific context of crowdsourcing, much research has been carried out for learning qualities of the crowd workers [1, 2, 7, 14, 15, 18, [27] [28] [29] 31] . In a pure learning setting devoid of strategic play, the closest setting to ours is the one in [30] which studies the problem in the context of crowdsourcing to maximize the number of successful tasks under a fixed budget. Note that all the above papers assume costs are known.
A learning algorithm can be potentially manipulated by a strategic agent so as to increase utility. This problem is addressed using MAB mechanism design theory [4, 5, 10, 11, 17, 21, 26, 29] . Most of the literature in this space (except [4] ) considers strategic agents with single dimensional private information and seeks to maximize social welfare. Our work, on the other hand, seeks to maximize the expected utility of the auctioneer. The work in [4] considers a multi-parameter setting and seeks to maximize welfare, but with an additive valuation model where the valuation of each agent is a linear combination of different private values. Our work is different from [4] as we aim to design an optimal auction in a capacitated setting where additive valuations do not apply.
We address this problem through a systematic study of the space of mechanisms when qualities of the agents are known (Section 4). Based on the characterization of these mechanisms which we obtain, we step towards the case where qualities need to be learnt (Section 5).
Notation and preliminaries
An auctioneer wishes to procure L units of an item from an agent pool N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. In this work, we make an important and reasonable assumption that the agent is not allowed to over-report his capacity. This is because if the auctioneer allocates the agent beyond his capacity, it is detected eventually when the agent fails to deliver. This could lead to imposition of a high penalty or may lead to blacklisting the agent from further participation. In contrast to over-reporting, under-reporting of capacity cannot be detected. In the absence of proper incentives, an agent can create virtual scarcity of agents by underreporting his capacity which can benefit him.
The auctioneer seeks to design a mechanism denoted by M = (x, t) where x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) (allocation) is the total number of units procured from the agents and t = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ) is the payments made to the agents. We denote the reported cost bŷ c i ∈ [c i , c i ] and the reported capacity byk i ∈ [k i , k i ]. Let b i = (ĉ i ,k i ) denote the bid of agent i and the bid vector of all the agents except i is denoted by b −i . Note that the allocation x and payment t depend on the bids reported by the agents and the qualities. Further, any valid allocation should ensure that capacity constraint is respected. We assume an independent private value model and quasi linear utilities to the agents. Therefore, given allocation x and payments t, the utility of agent i is given by u i = −c i x i + t i . Let X and T denote the expected allocations and expected payments when expectation is taken over bids of other agents. That is, X i (ĉ i ,k i ; q i ) represents the expected number of units procured from agent i when he bids cost per itemĉ i , bids capacityk i and the quality is q i . Similarly T i 's are defined. We now define some desirable properties for a mechanism if qualities were known.
Definition 1 (Bayesian Incentive Compatible)
A mechanism is called Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if reporting truthfully gives an agent highest expected utility when the other agents are truthful, with the expectation taken over type profiles of other agents. 
is the utility when the true bid profile is c, k and agent i reportsĉ i ,k i .
Definition 3 (Individually Rational)
A mechanism is called Individually Rational (IR) if no agent derives negative utility by participating in the mechanism. Formally, ∀i ∈ N,
which procures at most L items is called optimal if it maximizes the expected utility of the auctioneer subject to BIC and IR. The expection is taken over type profiles of all the agents.
Auction with known qualities
We now derive the characterization for any mechanism to be BIC and IR when the qualities are known. We then look at sufficient conditions to transform a BIC and IR mechanism to be optimal. Finally, we propose a DSIC, IR and optimal mechanism (2D-OPT) for regular type distributions.
Characterization
In the setting considered in the work, as described in Section 3, VCG mechanisms can be used to elicit the costs and capacities from the agents and it satisfies DSIC, IR. However, VCG mechanisms maximize social welfare and may or may not be utility maximizing for the auctioneer [24] . Any allocation should be compensated with at least the cost incurred by the agent, irrespective of the quality of the unit procured. We propose to pay a premium to each agent above his true cost so as to incentivize him to report costs and capacities truthfully. We define ∀i ∈ N,
The utility of an agent i with bid b i is given as,
Thus ρ i represents the offered utility when all the agents are truthful. With the above offered incentive, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 A mechanism is BIC and IR iff
∀i ∈ N , 1. X i (ĉ i ,k i ; q) is non-increasing inĉ i , ∀q and∀k i ∈ [k i , k i ].
ρ i (ĉ i ,k i ; q) is non-negative, and non-decreasing ink i ∀ q and ∀ĉ
We refer to the above three statements as conditions 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Proof To prove the necessity part, we first observe due to BIC,
We assumeĉ i > c i . The proof follows in identical lines otherwise. From (1),
which implies that,
Similarly using
Taking limitĉ i → c i ,we get,
Equation (2) implies, X i (c i , k i ; q) is non-increasing in c i . This proves condition 1 of the theorem in the forward direction. When the worker bids truthfully, from (1),
For BIC, (3) should be true. So,
This proves condition 3 of the theorem. BIC also requires,
This proves condition 2 of the theorem. Thus, these three conditions are necessary for BIC and IR properties. We now prove the sufficiency. Consider
So the IR property is satisfied. We assumeĉ i > c i . The proof is similar for the caseĉ i < c i . To establish BIC, consider:
Sufficiency conditions for Optimality
We now present sufficiency conditions for an IR, BIC mechanism to be optimal. Let F i (c i |k i ) and f i (c i |k i ) denote respectively the cumulative distribution and probability density function of cost of an agent i given the capacity.
Theorem 2 Suppose the allocation rule maximizes
subject to conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 1. Also suppose that the payment is given by
then such a payment scheme and allocation scheme constitute an optimal auction satisfying BIC and IR.
Proof The auctioneer's objective is to maximize her expected utility which is:
The second term of (8) is already similar to the desired form of the objective function of auctioneer given in (6) . We now use conditions 1 and 3 of Theorem 1 to arrive at the result. Consider the first term, . . .
(As we need truthfulness) 
Applying this in the above equation, we get that the objective function of the auctioneer is similar in form to (6) . Consider Condition 3 of Theorem 1, and set ρ i (c i , k i ) = 0, we get (7) . By construction, the mechanism is BIC and IR. And, since the auctioneer's expected utility is maximized the mechanism is optimal.
Analogous to the literature on optimal auction [12, 16, 23] , we assume regularity on our type distribution as follows.
Definition 5 (Regularity) We define the virtual cost function ∀i ∈ N as
We say that a type distribution is regular if ∀i, H i is non-decreasing in c i and non-increasing in k i .
This assumption is not restrictive in single dimension setting as standard techniques of ironing are available [23] . The ironing techniques can also be applied in bidimensional setting whenever the marginal cost distribution is independent of marginal capacity distribution.
2D-OPT: An Optimal Auction
We now present our mechanism 2D-OPT give in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3 Mechanism 2D-OPT is optimal, DSIC and IR.
Proof We will prove that 2D-OPT satisfies Theorem 2, which proves optimality, IR, and BIC. The allocation function (ALLOC) allocates maximum possible units to agents in decreasing order of G's, which in turn maximizes (6) . This is because (6) is a linear combination of G's. The monotonicity constraint 1 of Theorem 1 is satisfied due to regularity.
Fix an agent i with non-zero allocation. We will show that the payment given to the agent i given by 2D-OPT is the same as in (7). We fix a bid profile b −i , that yields non-zero allocation to agent i. The payment to agent i for bid profile (b i , b −i ) as per (7) is as follows.
If expectation is taken on b −i for (10), we get (7). The interchange of integral and expectation required therein is valid due to Fubini's Theorem [25] as the integrand is finite and non-negative. We will show that 2D-OPT computes this payment for any b −i . To compute RHS of (10), we first observe that when bidder i alone increases his bid, he can lose some (or all) of the units allocated to him to bidders with lower values of G. Hence, the allocation to agent i as a function of his bid z ∈ [c i ,c i ] is a step function as shown in Fig. 1 . And, the payment to be given to agent i as per (10) is the shaded area.
Let g (1) < g (2) < . . . ... < g (m) where g (1) > c i , g (m) < c i , be the costs at which agent i loses some more of his units. At these points, the allocation also dictates that an allocated Output: Vector x of units allocated to each agent.
end
agent r either completely exhausts the units x i allocated previously to i or he himself has no more capacity left.
On the other hand, the payment scheme of 2D-OPT first determines the allocation of x i (c i , k i , c −i , k −i ) units in the absence of i as given by Line 1 of Algorithm 1.
Let U =: {j ∈ N \ {i} : y j = 0} where y is the allocation to the worker set N \ {i}. We will partition the set U into V =: {j ∈ N \ {i} : For the sake of simpler exposition, we will assume U = V ∪W , the proof follows similar lines otherwise. Let (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a m ) as the indices of agents in V sorted in non-increasing order of G. Now, agents are allocated units from x i in the order given by (a k ) m k=1 . Now, it follows that G −1 i (Rq a 1 − H a 1 (b a 1 ) ) = g (1) and the allocation to this agent a 1 corresponds to y (1) . This forms the term y a 1 G −1 ( (Rq a 1 − H a 1 (b a 1 ) ) of the payment to i and corresponds
Algorithm 1 2D-OPT Mechanism

Fig. 1 Allocation to agent i as function of his bid z
to the area of rectangle ABCD. Similarly, the payment to i due to a 2 corresponds area of rectangle DEF G. This holds for all agents in the set V and rectangle P QRS denotes the payment due to a m . Finally, rectangle ST U V corresponds to agents in W or units that are unallocated as there is no capacity left in the remaining agents. The latter is captured by the term (x i − k y k )c i . Hence proposed payment computes (7) as we have shown it for any fixed b −i .
The offered utility ρ i when all agents are truthful is non-decreasing in the true capacity k i . This is due to the greedy nature of the allocation in ALLOC. Thus, condition 2 of Theorem 1 is satisfied.
Thus, 2D-OPT satisfies the Theorem 2. We therefore have that the proposed mechanism is BIC, IR, and optimal.
In respect of proving DSIC, we omit a formal proof due to space constraint and provide only a sketch. We note that the allocation is deterministic and the payment to agent i does not depend on his bid directly and only depends via the allocation. Furthermore, the payments are computed based on the allocations that are made in the absence of i for the x i units he has been allocated currently. For every unit, the agent is paid the best possible price he could have bid and still won the unit.
MAB Auction with Unknown Qualities
This section addresses the problem when qualities are not known and are to be learnt. In order to maximize her utility, the auctioneer will procure units from agents in a sequential manner so that she can make future decisions based on the past learning history. We now discuss definitions relevant in this setting.
Definition 6 (Reward Realization) A reward realization s is an n × L table where the (i, j )
entry represents an independent realization drawn from the true quality of i th agent when procuring the j th unit from him.
Note that (i, j ) entry in reward realization indicates the quality of i th agent when j th unit is procured from him and not the j th unit procured by the requester. Definition 7 (Stochastic BIC Mechanism) We say that a mechanism M = (x, t) is Stochastic BIC if truth telling by any agent i results in highest expected utility when expectation is taken over reward realizations and type profiles of other agents. Formally, (ĉ i ,k i , c i , k i ; s) ].
Sufficiency Conditions for Stochastic BIC
We now provide sufficiency conditions for a mechanism to be stochastic BIC and IR. We begin by stating the modified characterization theorem for the learning setting.
Theorem 4
Any mechanism that satisfies the following conditions ∀i ∈ N, ∀s ∈ [0, 1] n×L , is stochastic BIC and IR.
X i (c i , k i ; s) is non-increasing in
c i , ∀s and∀k i ∈ [k i , k i ].
ρ i (ĉ i ,k i ; s) non-negative, and non-decreasing ink i ∀s and ∀ĉ
The proof of the above theorem is similar to that of Theorem 1. Instead of fixing a quality, we are now fixing a reward realization. The mechanism also remains stochastic BIC and IR when it satisfies Theorem 4 and expectation is taken over reward realization.
In the above theorem, there is an inherent difficulty of computation of the payment integral. For a general allocation rule, the payment computation might require to observe reward realization which are not seen during the run of the mechanism which is not realistic in practice. In order to overcome this difficulty, we restrict the space of allocation functions and rather work with allocation functions that satisfy a set of natural properties. It also turns out that these properties are sufficient to ensure BIC and IR. The question about the necessity of these properties is still open. 1. Allocation to any agent i for the unit being allocated in round j , x j i , for any reward realization s depends only on the agent's bids and the reward realization of j units that are procured by the auctioneer so far and is non decreasing in terms of costs. 2. For the unit being allocated in round j and for any three distinct agents {α, β, γ } such that j th round unit is allocated to β. A change of bid by agent α should not transfer allocation of j th round unit from β to γ if other quantities are fixed till j units. 3. For all reward realizations s, x i (c i , k i ; s) is non-decreasing with increase in capacity k i
As mentioned earlier, these properties are natural. Property 1 states that the allocation should not depend on any future success realizations which are not observed. Property 2 is similar to Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property in the mechanism design theory i.e. if an agent i changes his bid then it should not affect the allocations of other agents. Property 3 states the allocation rule doesn't penalize an agent with higher capacity, when other parameters are identical.
Lemma 1 If an allocation rule x is well-behaved then, ∀s, and ∀k
Proof By slight abuse of notation, let x i (c i , j) denote the number of items procured by an agent i with bid c i until j items are procured. We need to prove that,
We will prove this by induction. At j = 1, the condition trivially holds by the monotonicity property of well-behaved allocation rule. Thus, by induction hypothesis, Note that x m depends on bids of all the agents. Since the cost of other agents and capacities of all the agents are held fixed, we have dropped these dependence for notational convenience. Let x * (c i , j) denote the number of units that are not procured by an agent i until j units, i.e. x * (c i , j) = j −x i (c i , j), we will prove that for any two units j, j :
We prove the above statement using induction again. If x * (c i , j) = x * (c i , j ) = 0, that means all the items are procured by the agent i, the statement is clearly true. Thus, by induction hypothesis,
Again by induction hypothesis, there exist latest rounds, j 1 < j and j 1 < j such that ∀m = i
Since j 1 and j 1 are the latest such rounds, units from j 1 + 2 to j and j 1 + 2 to j are procured only by agent i, thus we need to prove that allocation at round j 1 + 1 and j 1 + 1 is same with bid c i and c − i respectively. Since agent i is not allocated at these rounds, by property 2 of well-behaved allocation rule, the condition is satisfied. Thus, we have
Since the reward realization is fixed, if number of allocations to all the agents is same till j th unit procured then by property 1 of well-behaved allocation rule, we have
The following theorem guarantees a transformation of any well-behaved allocation rule into a stochastic BIC and IR mechanism.
Theorem 5 For a well-behaved allocation rule and any μ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a transformation that produces the transformed allocation (x) and payment (t) such that a) the resulting mechanism M = (x,t) is stochastic BIC and IR and b) the allocations x andx
coincide with probability at least 1 − nμ.
If we implement the following payment rule then we will get stochastic BIC by Theorem 4:
The challenge here is to compute the integral as the allocation is not known for bid profiles other thenĉ. The allocation therein depends on how the qualities are learnt. In order to compute this integral, we adopt a sampling procedure and transformation that uses Theorem 2 similar to [5] . 
Our self-resampling procedure is given in Algorithm 2 that returns vectors α, β based on input bids. These vectors are then used to compute the allocation and payment. In order to compute the integral, we need certain properties to be satisfied that are described in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3
The procedure in Algorithm 2 satisfies the following properties ∀i ∈ N : The algorithm that outputs the transformed allocation and the payment is described in Algorithm 3. 
Algorithm 2 Self-resampling Procedure
Proof Theorem5 We will prove that the transformed mechanism in Algorithm 3 satisfies all the properties in Theorem 4 when the input allocation rule is well-behaved and thus is stochastic BIC and IR. Transformed allocation and payment rule are denoted byx and t respectively. We
as the expected allocation with the expectation taken over randomization of the algorithm and bid profile of other agents. Similarly,
For all reward realizations s, we will prove two properties: (1) Allocation ruleX is monotone in terms of costs, and (2) the expected payment ruleT satisfies eg. (11) .
The monotonicity of allocation ruleX follows from the monotonicity of x (Lemma 1) and the monotonicity property 1 of Algorithm 2 (Property 1, Lemma 3).
We now prove that
where the expectation is taken over bids of other players as well as over the randomization of the Algorithm 3.
(Property 3 of Lemma 3)
We also have, 
2D-UCB: A learning mechanism
With the necessary machinery established, we now present the learning mechanism given in Algorithm 4. Mechanism 2D-UCB procures one unit at a time, learns the quality and makes the allocation similar to 2D-OPT on the basis of learnt qualities so far. The payment is computed with the help of transformed mechanism given in Algorithm 3.
. . , (α n (ĉ n ), β n (ĉ n )) using Algorithm 2 4 Allocate one unit to all agents and estimate empirical qualityq 
Theorem 6 2D-UCB is stochastic BIC and IR.
Proof We first prove that the allocation rule produced by 2D-UCB mechanism is wellbehaved. At every time, the mechanism allocates the unit to an agent with highest value of G i . The value ofĜ i only depends on learnt quality so far. It is monotone in terms of cost due to regularity assumption and monotonicity property of Algorithm 2. Thus Property 1 of well-behaved is satisfied. If an agent reduces his capacity then he might lose an allocation since no agent is allocated more then his bid capacity thus satisfying property 3. The allocation rule also satisfy property 2 (IIA) since the allocation is made to the agent with highest G i and if agent i changes his bid then it will not affect theĜ i s of other agents. Since the payment structure follows from Algorithm 3, and conditions of Theorem 4 are also satisfied and thus the resulting mechanism is stochastic BIC and IR.
Algorithm 4 2D-UCB Mechanism
Simulations
In Section 5, we have presented a learning mechanism 2D-UCB, which embeds 2D-OPT. We have theoretically established the optimality of 2D-OPT when the qualities of the agents are known. We evaluate the performance of our learning mechanism 2D-UCB via simulations.
In the simulations, we compare the expected utility per unit given by 2D-UCB against the optimal benchmark 2D-OPT which is fully aware of underlying quality. Another good benchmark to compare against is an ε−separated mechanism. An ε−separated mechanism allocates εL units to all the agents irrespective of their bids. The agent performance on these rounds are then used to estimate their empirical qualities. The empirical qualities after round εL are treated as true qualities and used for allocation in (1 − ε)L future rounds with 2D-OPT. During these rounds, the qualities are not updated further. It is easy to verify that an ε− separated mechanism is BIC and IR.
For the simulations, the number of units of the item (L), which the auctioneer wishes to procure, is chosen at first as 10 3 and subsequently at nine other linearly spaced steps from 10 3 to 10 5 . We choose a pool of five agents(N ). A unit procured from an agent i yields a Bernoulli reward with mean q i drawn uniformly from the interval [0.5, 1] (in line with the crowdsourcing literature). The private types (costs and capacities) of the agents are independently distributed. We choose the costs to be drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. The capacity is a positive integer drawn with equal probability in the range with upper limit as L and lower limit large enough to meet the uniform exploration. This choice of distribution of private types was done to ensure regularity. Any other suitable regular distribution may be used for the types. For this chosen type distribution, it can be shown that the virtual cost function for an agent i is H i = 2c i through direct computation. For the ε-separated mechanisms, we choose the number of exploration rounds as {L 1/6 , L 1/3 , L 1/2 , L 2/3 }. A Bernoulli reward 1 of a procured instance yields a reward of R = 30 to auctioneer. The performance measure used is the expected average utility per unit obtained by the auctioneer plotted as a function of the number of units. To estimate the expected average utility, 200 independent samples are drawn from the type distribution; for each such sample the number of units required to be procured is varied; at each value of L multiple instances(100) of reward realization is drawn from the true underlying quality. As L is varied, the capacity is suitably scaled yielding a constant average utility for the benchmark as shown in Fig. 2 . We choose μ = 0.1 for 2D-UCB.
The simulations indicate that all the mechanisms yield average utilities per unit which asymptotically converge to 2D-OPT. The performance of 2D-UCB however is superior in the sense that it approaches 2D-OPT faster.
Summary
We have studied a class of mechanisms which yield a stochastic reward to the auctioneer following an allocation to an agent. We have presented optimal learning mechanisms which truthfully elicit multiple private types. A corresponding welfare maximizing version follows directly from the ideas presented in this work. It would be interesting to study a setting where the allocation is over a subset of agents rather than a single agent. A complete characterization of a learning algorithm in this space is still open as we have provided only sufficient conditions. Also, a theoretic lower bound on regret would be interesting.
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